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Abstract—Combined health information and web-based 
technologies can be used to support healthcare and research 
activities associated with electronic health records (EHRs). 
EHRs used for research purposes demand privacy, 
confidentiality and all information governance concerns are 
addressed. However, existing solutions are unable to meet the 
evolving research needs especially when supporting data access 
and linkage across organization boundaries. In this work, we 
show how semantic methods can aid in the specification and 
enforcement of policies for privacy protection. This is 
illustrated through a case study associated with the 
Australasian Diabetes Data Network (ADDN), the national 
paediatric type-1 diabetes data registry and the Australian 
Urban Research Infrastructure Network (AURIN) platform 
that supports Australia-wide access to urban and built 
environment data sets. Specifically we show that through 
extending the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language 
(XACML) with semantic capabilities, we are able to support 
fine-grained privacy-preserving policies leveraging semantic 
reasoning that is not directly available in XACML or other 
existing security policy specification languages. 
Keywords-privacy; electronic health records (EHRs); 
ontology; semantic web rule language (SWRL); XACML; 
obligation component 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Online data management is essential in the modern 
digital-rich world. In the biomedical domain, there is a 
seismic change occurring from paper-based documents to 
electronic records. Stakeholders across health industries have 
appreciated significant benefits through increased 
digitization including information accuracy and efficiency. 
Many challenges remain to be addressed however. Clinical 
and biomedical data are obviously sensitive since they often 
contain individual personal information. To protect personal 
and sensitive data from malicious or non-malicious leaks, 
organizations have adopted a range of solutions, such as 
requiring informed consent from data subjects, removing 
identifiable information and data anonymisation. Technical 
security approaches such as authentication, authorization, 
auditing and accounting can help support such activities. 
Authentication is used to identify legitimate users often by 
checking their usernames and passwords; authorization 
further restricts the operations that can be performed by an 
authenticated user, whilst auditing and accounting 
capabilities are used to record a history of access and usage. 
This work predominantly focuses on authorisation – the most 
demanding of capabilities that are required. Different access 
control models and policy languages have been defined to 
support authorisation. The international standard, XACML 
(eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) includes 
common request/response protocols and associated policy 
components to support authorisation [1]. Due to its 
standardisation, widespread adoption and rich 
expressiveness, XACML has been widely implemented in 
EHR systems [2] [3] [4]. In particular, the obligation 
component of XACML has the potential to seamlessly 
introduce other policies (e.g. privacy policies) by specifying 
what extra actions should be taken before data is released or 
linked. However traditional XACML policies are specified in 
a static manner, which cannot fit the demands of distributed 
application due to the heterogeneity. For that reason, we 
propose to extend access control policies with semantic 
functionalities, building on previous work [5]. Through 
reasoning on the domain knowledge with semantic 
capabilities, we show how we can overcome syntactic 
language barriers and support advanced authorisation of 
subjects involved in a given collaboration. One challenge in 
undertaking this is where multiple datasets are combined and 
exchanged with heterogeneous policies. Due to the 
information accumulation, it is often not possible to provide 
adequate protection by enforcing static and independent 
policies on data linkages across organisation boundaries [6]. 
To solve this, we present a semantic approach to mitigate and 
reason about potential privacy leakage. Through reasoning 
on the domain knowledge, we can reduce the risk of privacy 
leakage that can occur in inter-organisational linkage 
scenarios.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
reviews the state of art in related fields including data 
anonymisation, access control models and semantic 
technologies. Taking the type-1 diabetes patient data from 
ADDN as an example, Section 3 explores how to formulate 
XACML policies into semantic concepts so as to fit the 
demands of current applications. Particularly, the privacy 
requirements are specified as obligations related to privacy 
concerns. In Section 4, a linkage case study is introduced that 
utilises geospatially-annotated data from ADDN and the 
AURIN platform. Instead of adding new rule/policies for 
linkage, we show that through a semantic approach we can 
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deliver real-time protection and reuse of existing policies. 
Section 5 summarises conclusions and identifies areas of 
future work. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Data sharing within clinical collaborations is essential. In 
the field of healthcare, sharing data for secondary use allows 
discoveries in clinical trials for new drugs, treatments, 
benchmarking care and outcome more generally. Since 
health data contains personal information, researchers are 
expected to use data in both an ethical and confidential 
manner. There are several essential procedures that are 
required to support this research process [7]: 
• Consent: data related to an individual’s health 
typically contains both identifiable and non-
identifiable information [8]. Before granting the 
access to this data for research purposes, data holders 
(hospitals/clinical institutions) are often required to 
obtain consent from patients (or assent in the case of 
minors or others that are not legally able to provide 
consent). Upon receiving confirmation of consent, 
data holders are then better equipped to allow secure 
queries for research use outside of the given hospital 
setting – noting that consent alone is not enough to 
allow access. 
• Anonymity: to protect patient privacy, health data for 
secondary use often needs to be de-identified 
(anonymized). Depending on the purpose and nature 
of the research, different degrees of data 
anonymisation are often demanded. For instance rare 
diseases may have specific restrictions on identify 
data, e.g. year of birth only, compared to more 
common conditions. 
• Access control: data needs to be protected by access 
control policies to ensure ethical and validated data 
access, as well as support minimal knowledge 
leakage. Domain-specific regulations and risk 
management need to be defined and enforced to 
ensure this process is adhered to. These rules are 
often formalized based on minimizing potential 
security issues [3] [9]. 
A. Data Anonymisation 
De-identified EHRs are often shared for research 
purposes. In Australia, the National Statement on Ethical 
Conduct in Human Research has classified medical data into 
individually identifiable, re-identifiable and non-identifiable. 
In addition, it specifies in what contexts, which type of data 
is allowed to be collected, stored and published. In the 
United States, privacy issues are covered by Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 1996 (HIPPA) 
which defines different levels of de-identification as 
guidelines of data anonymity. A common model to achieve 
this is through “safe harbors” whereby de-identification can 
be achieved by removing 18 commonly identifying attributes 
such as name, address, date, biometric information, serial 
numbers of personal devices etc. With the increasing 
complexity in data usage, however, it is not always easy to 
group data items according to their sensitivity. What is more, 
isolated datasets can often reveal sensitive information. For 
instance, De Montjoye has shown that only four pieces of 
spatio-temporal information are enough to re-identify 
individuals [10]. Moreover, by matching clinical data with 
external resources, hidden factors/trends about 
patients/diseases can be ascertained.  
Technical solutions based on k-anonymity aim to reduce 
the risk of re-identification by obscuring individuals with 
other k-1 identical records [11] [12]. To achieve this, the 
approach relies on generalising or suppressing “quasi-
identifiable” variables. To further strengthen the power, k-
anonymity variants such as t-closeness [13] and l-diversity 
[14] are proposed to assimilate value distributions and reduce 
the granularity of data representation. In addition, the k-
anonymity algorithm can be further extended with specific 
application purposes. For instance, in addition to a global 
measure k, [15] deems that the risk evaluation should include 
the trustworthiness of users. In [16], data owners are allowed 
to express their privacy preferences and then influence the 
overall anonymisation. Another important practice is 
differential privacy, which aims to maximize the accuracy of 
queries from statistical databases while minimizing the 
chance of re-identification [17]. However, it may not always 
be the case that it is possible to identify differential privacy 
distributions in inter-organisational data linkage and data 
sharing applications, especially when dealing with arbitrary 
queries on diverse data models. Through linking data, it is 
possible to infer new knowledge about individual (or group) 
that cannot always be predicted. As a consequence, data 
cannot be protected by independent solutions. As a result, 
such techniques do not fulfil the unique needs for healthcare 
in data linkages across multiple and potential 
dynamic/evolving collaborations. 
B. Access Control and Semantic Technoogy 
Restricting access to datasets to meet associated 
regulations is essential. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) 
is a typical access control model. It was originally proposed 
to provide secure access based on grouping users/resources 
and attaching security levels to these groups 
(roles/clearances). In addition to the role concept, attribute 
based access control (ABAC) incorporates more extensive 
attributes into policies, and thus enables a finer-grained 
access control. XACML has been widely used to implement 
ABAC systems. Variants of ABAC models designed for 
special applications also exist, e.g. factoring in location and 
time as additional conditions that can be used to make 
decisions about the authorisation [18-20]. The XACML 
framework supports an obligation component that can be 
used to define the actions that must be taken when 
permissions are granted [21]. In other words, the permissible 
actions cannot take effect until the associated obligations are 
executed successfully. For instance, the policy “a clinician 
can collect and disclose personal information from a child by 
obtaining parental consent from the child’s guardians” can be 
constructed by a permission (collect and release a child’s 
details) and an obligation (obtaining consent from the child’s 
guardians). This can be specified as a premise and a 
consequence respectively. As part of an access control 
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framework, obligations can facilitate the implementation of 
privacy regulations even if they are not explicitly devised for 
that purpose. For instance, [22] demonstrates an enforcement 
of HIPPA privacy rules within access control models in 
healthcare applications. In [23], further methodologies are 
provided in devising privacy-aware systems through turning 
data protection regulations as obligations and associated 
actions. 
As mentioned, privacy leakage happens in 
isolated/combined datasets while semantic reasoning is one 
way to deliver dynamic protection. Language barriers in 
decentralised systems can often be tackled by formalising 
subsumption and equivalence through the Ontology Web 
Language (OWL) knowledge base [24-26]. In dealing with 
complex situations with various regulations, it is often 
required to have policies generated based on implicit 
knowledge. The Semantic Rule Web Language (SWRL) [27] 
can be adopted to support policies based on domain 
knowledge [28-30]. Researchers in this field have explored 
semantic methods by giving most attentions to facilitating 
authorisation; however privacy leakage remains a key 
challenge for distributed applications. To fill this gap, we 
semantically extend XACML with extra obligation measures 
[31]. Through using the ontology editor, protégé 4.0 
(http://protege.stanford.edu/), policy components are 
conceptualised as classes, instances, properties as well as 
semantic rules. Finally, we take the linkage scenarios of two 
major and real-life systems, ADDN and AURIN to illustrate 
the way interconnection between authorisation and privacy 
protection on ad hoc data linkage queries can be realised. 
III. SEMANTIC PRIVACY AWARE XACML 
A. Authorisation Framework 
The XACML policy framework consists of three levels 
of entities: the PolicySet, the Policy and the Rule. 
Specifically, a Rule represents the smallest unit specifying 
access requirements. Each rule is assigned with an Effect, 
e.g. deny, permit or not applicable, which becomes effective 
when the (requests) attributes are validated against the 
(policies) constraints of the Target and Condition. In 
XACML, a Target builds the fundamental constraints for the 
context of Subject, Action, Resource and Environment. 
Optionally, there are some higher-level constraints enclosed 
in the Condition to further restrict authorisation. Beyond 
compliance checking, policy makers have rights to add extra 
security measures in Obligation as the “last defender”, e.g. 
special privacy regulations on data use. TABLE I shows the 
semantic specification of the XACML framework. 
TABLE I.  MAPPING XACML COMPONENTS INTO OWL CONCEPTS 











Target hasSubject Element 




Element hasConstraint Attribute 
In addition to the policy components and their explicit 
relations, compliance checking is typically based on concrete 
facts. For instance, a pseudo policy (Policy-a) in Figure 1 
defines “clinicians can collect and read the type-1 diabetes 
mellitus (T1DM) patients records for research by executing 
the de-identification operation”. The constraints “Clinician”, 
“T1DMPatient”, “Read” and “ForResearch” are respectively 
applied on the elements Sub_a, Res_a, Act_a and Env_a, 
which collectively construct the target and rule, i.e. Tar_a 
and Rule_a. Besides, the obligation “De-identification” is 
the premise of the permit decision becoming effective in the 
system. For instance, Figure 2 shows the OWL modelling the 
instance of policy, rule and target. 
 
Figure 1. Example XACML policy (Policy-a) 
 
Figure 2. OWL-based policy specification (Policy-a) 
In addition to using the OWL, semantic rules can also be 
used to realise XACML compliance checking, which helps 
reduce the efforts on specification by reusing domain-
specific contents. As shown in Figure 2, the attribute 
“T1DMPatients” is described under the resource tag, and 
thus it only acts as a resource attribute in Tar_a, Rule_a and 
Policy_a. If it needs to be applied in other contexts, e.g. 
<Policy Id=”Policy_a” Algorithm=”deny-unless-
permit”> 
  <Rule Id="Rule_a" Effect=Permit> 
   <Target Id = “Tar_a”> 
<Subject Id=”Sub_a” AttributeValue 
="Clinician"/> 
<Resource Id=”Res_a” AttributeValue 
="T1DMPatients"/> 
<Action Id=”Act-a” AttributeValue ="Read"/> 
<Environment Id=”Env_a” AttributeValue 
="ForResearch"/>          
   </Target> 
   </Condition> 
  </Rule> 
  <Obligation Id = “De-identification” 
FulfillOnEffect = “Permit”/> 
</Policy>
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Tar_b, Rule_b and Policy_a (the nesting structure allows one 
policy containing more than one rule), it typically has to be 
stated again. However, through reasoning on the Semantic 
Rule (1) and the semantic model, the “context” information 
can be dynamically assigned without repeated statements. As 
shown in Figure 3, based on the explicit relations of target 
elements and relevant rules, Tar_a can be dynamically 
associated with constraints in different aspects. 
Target(?a), hasResource(?a, ?b), hasConstraint(?b, ?c) ! 
hasResourceConstraint(?a, ?c)                                                      (1) 
In addition to target elements, rules can be formulated 
based on their (semantic) dependency, and use in policies 
and policy sets. For example, through reasoning on the 
Semantic Rule (2), the subject constraint “Clinician” can be 
associated to the related rules (Rule_a). 
Rule (?a), hasTarget (?a, ?b), hasSubjectConstraint(?b, ?c) ! 
hasSubjectConstraint (?a, ?c)                                                        (2) 
 
Figure 3. Semantic reasoning on Tar_a constraints 
Similar to policies, the XACML request protocol is 
described with attributes of different aspects [32]. 
Correspondingly, they are mapped to semantic properties 
“has_X_category” and distinct attributes. Suppose the 
Request_a is submitted to the system like “clinicians 
(subject) who are part of Project-T1DM (environment) 
request to read (action) the T1DM patient records 
(resource)”. To show the feasibility in compliance checking, 
this can be modelled as certain semantic concepts in the 
TABLE II. Different from policy management, it is 
unnecessary to formulate requests by semantic reasoning 
since technically they can be arbitrary statements that 
originate from external parties. 
TABLE II.  MAPPING XACML REQUEST PROFILE INTO OWL 
CONCEPTS 
Class Instances Associated properties Instances 








Policy evaluation is separated into a two-stage reasoning 
process. At the first stage, candidate rules pairs are identified 
through evaluating on the “match” function. It is noted that 
only the attributes falling into the same contexts are 
compared to make authorisation decisions. For instance, 
Semantic Rule (3) shows that through applying the “pairwise 
properties” hasEnv_Category - hasEnvironmentConstraint 
the consistency of attributes can be ensured. In the same way, 
rules on attribute comparison can also be formulated for the 
contexts of Subject, Resource and Action. 
Rule (?a), Request (?b), hasEnv_Category (?b, ?su), 
hasEnvironmentConstraint (?a, ?sub), match (?su, ?sub) ! 
candidateRuleE (?b, ?a)                                                                 (3) 
Attributes (such as literals, numeric, time, date) can be 
extensively covered through extending the definition of 
match(). For instance, with the built-in property sameAs 
identifying the same entities (instances/classes), Rule (4) can 
enable the match() function to compare identical semantic 
concepts [33]. A more complicated case happens among the 
numeric values, such as “>10”. To support this, another built-
in function, greaterThan, as well as the data property 
isValuedAs (?x, ?value) can be used to take numeric 
attributes, as shown in Rule (5). To a broad extent, match() 
can be formulated for particular applications through 
attaching domain knowledge. For instance, the environment 
attribute Project_T1DM (Request_a) refers to a project 
where the clinician is involved. For example, if there is 
background knowledge in the hospital that people have the 
same purposes as the projects they are working on, this can 
be expressed in Rule (6), i.e. research project Project_T1DM 
and hasPurposeOf(Project_T1DM, ForResearch), through 
reasoning about the knowledge and rules (3) and (6), it is 
possible to deduce the intermediate result 
match(Project_T1DM, for_research)  and then recognise the 
candidate rule, i.e. candidateRuleE (Request_a, Rule_a). 
Attribute(?x), Attribute(?y), sameAs(?x, ?y) ! match(?x, ?y)      (4) 
Attribute (?a), Attribute(?b), isValuedAs(?a, num1), isValuedAs(?b, 
num2), greaterThan (num1, num2) ! match (?a, ?b)                   (5) 
Attribute (?a), Attribute (?b), hasPurposeOf (?a, ?b) ! match (?a, 
?b)                                                                                                   (6) 
Policy compliance requires that all target attributes that 
are included in the rule are satisfied by the request. Therefore, 
based on the searched candidate rules, it is necessary to 
determine the applicable rules by combining intermediate 
results of the last stage. For that reason, Semantic Rule (7) 
implies that the compliance between XACML rules and 
requests should be based on attributes covering all aspects. 
Rule (?a), Request (?b), candidateRuleS (?b, ?a), candidateRuleR 
(?b, ?a), candidateRuleE (?b, ?a), candidateRuleA (?b, ?a)! 
applicableRule (?b, ?a)                                                                  (7) 
Each XACML rule should have one effect assigned. Due 
to the nesting structure, it is possible for a single request to 
have multiple rules that need to be applied. Therefore, to 
achieve a final decision, XACML standardises a set of rule 
combining algorithms [34]. Since the open-world assumption 
(OWA) of the semantic web assumes incomplete information 
is not equal to false or failure [35], “permit” is defined as the 
default effect in this semantic model. For this reason, the 
algorithm “deny-unless-permit” is adopted to enforce the 
effects as shown in Rule (8). In particular, hasRule and 
fromPolicy are inverse properties, which means the 
expression fromPolicy(?a, ?b) is semantically equivalent to 
hasRule(?b, ?a). With this formulation, Rule (8) can be used 
to identify applicable rules associating with the same policy. 
Semantic reasoning 
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Request(?x), applicableRule(?x, ?a), hasEffect(?a, permit), 
fromPolicy(?a, ?c) ! finalEffect(?x, permit), finaEffectFrom (?x, 
?c)                                                                                                   (8) 
In the healthcare field, having extra security measures is 
essential because it allows privacy policies to be 
implemented on certain data points while avoiding the 
answers based upon “zero” or “all” permissions. In XACML 
policies, the obligation component is the key to achieving 
this goal. Taking the result such as finalEffect(Request_a, 
permit) and finalEffectFrom(Request_a, Policy_a) it is 
possible to locate the attached obligations. Rule (9) shows 
how to associate obligations with the request. According to 
the definition of Policy_a, the inferred obligation De-
identification should be implemented before the permission 
to Request_a takes effect. 
Request(?x), finaEffectFrom(?x, ?y), hasObligation(?y, ?z) ! 
hasObligation (?x, ?z)                                                                    (9)  
So far we show that semantic methods can facilitate 
policy development and evaluation. As shown in Figure 4, 
attributes are the elements that underpin the matching 
between requests and policies. With a set of candidate 
attributes and reasoning (Stage 1) the syntax of the 
information can be checked; applicable rules are then located 
in Stage-2, resulting in effects and obligations that are made 
to ultimately make access decisions. 
 
Figure 4. Evaluate policy and request in parallel 
B. Privacy Protection – A case study based on ADDN 
In clinical systems, the contents of single and combined 
databases demands various levels of sensitivity and privacy 
are adhered to. Through reasoning on Semantic Rules (7)-(9), 
authorising decisions can be made with certain obligations 
enforced. We consider here a scenario associated with the 
Australasian Diabetes Data Network (ADDN - 
http://www.addn.org.au/). ADDN provides a centralized 
repository of patients with type-1 diabetes across Australia. 
ADDN supports an RBAC model (Clinicians, Coordinators 
and Researchers) with specific levels of access (Centre, 
Multiple Centre and All) that are used to restrict the access to 
and use of medical data by researchers. As shown in Figure 5, 
ADDN records can be expressed in a patient-centered pattern. 
Since policies are formulated using the data schema, patient 
records can be represented at the structural level, i.e. 
Patient(Patient_x), hasType(Patient_x, Types),  
hasEthnicity(Patient_x, Ethnicities) and hasZIP(Patient_x, 
ZIPs). The actual database in ADDN has collected over 200 
data points about patients with over 5000 patients currently 
entered. To address privacy protection concerns, we consider 
the access to and use of the data related to the disease type, 
ethnicity and zip code. 
 
Figure 5. Semantic ADDN data schema (Patient_x) 
In ADDN, using the aforementioned data elements, the 
risk of privacy leakage is reduced by generalising/supressing 
identifiable attributes. For instance, ethnicity information is 
specified by referencing the Australian Standard 
Classification of Cultural and Ethnic Groups (ASCCEG)1, as 
shown in TABLE III. Specifically, it is organised in a 3-level 
structure, such as “6 North-east Asian”, “61- Chinese Asian” 
and  “6101-Chinese”. Considering the health conditions 
identified from certain groups or places may cause 
stigmatization and discrimination [36], hence one privacy 
demand is that only the aggregated ethnicities (at the first 
level of obfuscation) should be released from ADDN. 
TABLE III.  HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE OF ASCCEG 









6199 Chinese Asian, nec. 





It might seem that no privacy leakage could happen 
however this may not be the case in particular places. As 
shown in Figure 6, the Census statistics from the Australian 
Bureau Statistics (ABS) indicates the ethnicity distribution in 
the Box Hill (a suburb of Victoria, Australia) is comprised of 
more than 20 percent Chinese 2 . As a result, there is an 
increasing chance to identify which records are from Chinese 
patients because the combination of “North-East Asian” and 
“3128”  (the zip code of Box Hill)3 is almost equivalent to 
“Chinese residents in Box Hill”. Since ADDN should avoid 
potential re-identification based on ethnical details, a specific 
obligation (e.g. de-identification) can be defined to block 
certain combinations of queries and results. 
                                                          
1 Australian Bureau Statistics (ABS). Australian Standard Classification of 
Cultural and Ethnic Group (2011). 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/1249.0 
2 Box Hill, Victoria. Demographics. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Box_Hill,_Victoria#Demographics 




Figure 6. Partial statistics of Box Hill residents 
Queries need to be authorised. Through semantic 
reasoning, only the data in the request should be used to 
answer the query.  Therefore, Rule (10) can be formulated to 
verify arbitrary queries through the expressions with 
hasObligation and queryFrom. The service Mask refers to 
the concrete implementation of De-identification. According 
to the privacy policies, this can detect the risk of privacy 
leakage and then properly process the data with “sensitive” 
attributes. Only the permitted resource will be used to answer 
the query. For instance, the resource in question 
“PatientT1DM” refers to the EHRs collected from T1DM 
patients. As mentioned, Patient_x in the data schema can 
represent all records. This can be refined by the specific 
attributes. For instance, taking an aggregated zip code, 
3XXX, we can focus on a subset of patients. Through 
reasoning on the previous results, the consequence can 
indicate the target records (answerQuery(Patient_x, 
Query_a_n)) and services (Mask(Patient_x)). 
Query (?q), Request (?r), hasObligation(?r, De-identification), 
hasRes_Category(?y, ?d), hasPatient (?d, ?p), queryFrom(?q, ?r) 
! Mask(?p), answerQuery(?p, ?q)                                      (10) 
Based on those intermediate results, Semantic rule (11) - 
(13) are used to conduct the risk analysis. Particularly, the 
class RiskScope is formulated to indicate sensitive attributes 
such as “3128” and “North East Asian” in this case. In 
answering the query with such attributes as conditions and 
results, e.g. “SELECT …, Ethnicity; FROM ADDN; 
WHERE ZIP= ‘3128’”, the resulting dataset should be 
suppressed/generalised since the condition can make the 
privacy information (i.e. specific ethnicity) inferable, 
depending on external knowledge. The first query case is 
shown in Figure 7 a). The ethnicity values are suppressed 
due to aggregate contents found in the system. Similarly, to 
the query such as “SELECT …, ZIPs; FROM ADDN; 
WHERE Ethnicity=‘North East Asian’”, zip 
codes in the result set can be generalised like “312X”, as 
shown as Figure 7 b). Considering the high risk of releasing 
ethnicities and zip codes, queries such as “SELECT …, 
ZIPs, Ethnicities…” should be directly denied, as 
shown in Figure 7 c). 
Mask(?x), Ethnicity(?e), ZIP(?z), RiskScope(?z), answerQuery(?x, 
?q), Query(?q), selectFields(?q, ?e), whereIn(?q, ?z) ! 
suppressing(?q, ?e)         (11) 
Mask(?x), Ethnicity(?e), ZIP(?z), answerQuery(?x, ?q), Query(?x), 
RiskScope(?e), selectFields(?q, ?z), whereIn(?q, ?e) ! 
generalising(?q, ?z)        (12) 
Query(?x), ZIP(?z), Ethnicity(?e), selectFields(?x, ?e), 
selectFields(?x, ?z) ! resultAs(?x, deny)                                    (13) 
 
a) Query_a_1 for patients’ ethnicities 
 
b) Query_a_2 for patients’ zip codes 
 
c) Query_a_3 for patients’ zip code and ethnicities 
Figure 7. Example queries from request_a 
Using domain-specific knowledge, semantic rules can be 
reasoned to compute these extra measures related to releasing 
query results. For instance, both generalising (Query_a_2, 
ZIPs) and suppressing (Query_a_1, Ethnicities) can be 
achieved through a semantically-enabled policy decision 
point (PDP) and then enforced by a policy enforcement point 
(PEP) related to the queries. Since the purpose here is to 
protect linkage privacy, such local policy constructs provide 
the foundation for policy generation. 
IV. CASE STUDY- PRIVACY PROTECTION ON LINKAGE 
AURIN AND ADDN 
In addition to querying a single dataset, linkage queries 
may also lead to privacy threats. To show the semantic 
approach is feasible for linkage applications, we consider a 
scenario where a researcher wishes to find the correlation 
between alcohol consumption and T1DM incidence. In doing 
so, it is necessary to compare the number of T1DM patients 
and their neighbouring bottle shops. The Australian Urban 
Research Infrastructure Network (AURIN, 
http://aurin.org.au/) was established as a comprehensive 
research platform to support seamless and secure access to a 
wide array of data. It includes over 2000 data sets from 70 
major and typically definitive data agencies. This includes 
the official details of licensed premises provided by the 
Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation 
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(VCGLR) 4. As shown in Figure 8, a typical scenario can be 
depicted where the Zip codes of both data sets facilitates the 
data linkage of T1DM and locations of bottleshops. In this 
case, we consider Alice (Clinician) queries the ADDN data 
with “bottle-shop data”. TABLE IV shows the linked dataset 
of ADDN and AURIN. Since the accumulating contents may 
distinguish some aggregated values, it is necessary for the 
linking component to extend the security measures before 
releasing any results. 
 
Figure 8. Access to linked datasets from ADDN and AURIN 
TABLE V shows the request to the query such as 
“SELECT Suburbs, ZIPs; FROM Linkage; 
WHERE Ethnicity =‘North East Asia’”. 
According to Rule (12) in ADDN, sensitive zip codes will be 
aggregated like “312X”, “31XX”, “3XXX” etc. However, 
newly-added variables of Suburb may make the protection 
ineffective since the suburb-postcode mappings are publicly 
accessible. Based on the existing classification system5, both 
Australian zip codes and suburbs can be semantically 
modelled and associated to each other through the 
expressions such as subclassOf(“3128”,”312X”), 
subclassOf(“3129”,”312X”) and sameAs(“3128”, “Box 
Hill”) etc. By reasoning about the extended knowledge and 
existing semantic rules, the resulting data can be organised as 
TABLE VI with decreased risk. In addition, attribute 
combinations such as “language-nationality”, “gender-year 
of birth” may also pose threats to linkage applications. 
Through using the semantic model, privacy policies can be 
dynamically generated by reasoning about the linked 
knowledge from independent sites. Compared with adding 
particular policies for each query, this work can satisfy the 
demands of distributed systems by delivering dynamic 
protection to ever-changing resources. 
TABLE IV.  LINKAGE DATABASE BASED ON ZIP CODES 
SID* Type Ethnicity Zip code Shop ID* Suburb 
099999 1 North 
East Asia 
3128 31204487 Box Hill 
099999 1 North 
East Asia 
3128 31215064 Box Hill 
099999 1 North 
East Asia 
3128 31249712 Box Hill 
099998 1 South 
East Asia 
3053 32233992 Carlton 
                                                          
4 Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation (VCGLR). 
www.vcglr.vic.gov.au 
5 Australian Statistical Geography Standard (ASGS). 
http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/D3310114.nsf/home/Australian+Statisti
ca+Geography+Standard+(ASGS) 
099998 1 South 
East Asia 
3053 31200296 Carlton 
099998 1 South 
East Asia 
3053 31921796 Carlton 
099998 1 South 
East Asia 
3053 32227111 Carlton 
…… …… …… …… …… …… 
TABLE V.  QUERYING RESULTS BY ETHNICITIES*  
SID* Zip code Suburb Ethnicity 
099999 312X Box Hill North East Asia 
099999 312X Box Hill North East Asia 
099999 312X Box Hill North East Asia 
…… …… …… …… 
*query conditions in dash lines are not included in the result  
TABLE VI.  QUERYING RESULTS BY ETHNICITIES (AFTER REASONING) 











Techniques such as k-anonymity and XACML are 
insufficient to tackle arbitrary queries in linkage applications 
due to their static nature. Specifically, the k-anonymity 
model requires all the query results meet a uniform criteria 
such as “the equivalence class size should be at least equal to 
3” in the case where data is only released if there are 3 or 
more individuals in a given suburb for example. However, in 
answering the query shown in the last section, it is possible 
to violate the regulation by releasing the contents as shown in 
TABLE V. Compared with traditional access control 
policies, this work can not only connect the authorization and 
privacy protection through semantic inferences, but also 
facilitate the dynamic demands of knowledge expansion in 
linkage systems. It is noted that this work is not to replace 
existing techniques. Instead, it is intended to complement the 
deficiencies of distributed applications. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this work, we present a semantic XACML model to 
authorize access to sensitive information during data linkage. 
Through extending XACML policies with semantic rules, we 
have shown that we are able to protect private information of 
patients across organizational boundaries. In the next stage, 
we are going to further explore trust management and 
integrate it into the access control system to support richer 
sensitive information scenarios in the health domain. 
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